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Abstract: Subnational governments in China are suffering from urgent urban 
development demands and severe fiscal pressure, public-private partnerships 
(PPPs) are hence strongly promoted to attract private investors to participate in 
the development and operation of urban rail projects. However, there is no 
formal assessment to determine the degree of private involvement in a PPP 
project. This question is more critical in the sector of urban rail, in which the 
huge investment cannot rely on the private sector alone. This study hence 
aimed to develop a five-stage systematic procedural framework to determine 
the optimal private involvement in an urban rail PPP project in China. The 
findings add to the current knowledge base by summarising an appropriate and 
systematic procedural framework for the allocation of involvement in a PPP 
project. They are also beneficial for the industry practitioners as a management 
framework to determine the appropriateness of private involvement. 
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1 Introduction 
On the executive meeting of the State Council on 31 July 2013, Premier Keqiang Li 
stated that the government would continue to support the private investment in the 
infrastructure development. The central government also claimed to further widen the 
market access of public services to eligible private investors with sound credit. Stepping 
into the year of 2014, which was considered as one of the very important years for 
public-private partnership (PPP) in China, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) have been extraordinarily active in 
promoting and leading the development of PPP. In December 2014, the MOF issue 
several important documents including ‘Operational Guidelines for PPPs (Trial 
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Implementation)’ and ‘Guidelines for PPP Contract (Trial Implementation)’. At the same 
time, the NDRC also published their version of operational guidelines and contract 
guidelines. These newly issued regulations show the ongoing positive attitude of the 
central government. It is therefore expected to see more private involvement in 
infrastructure development in China via PPP mode (Cheng et al., 2016). 
According to China’s 13th Five-Year Plan (Xinhuanet, 2016), China will increase the 
government’s focus on innovation – with particular emphasis on infrastructure 
development in order to respond to the rising urbanisation. The government is expected 
to continuously promote the development of public transportation to relieve traffic jams 
and enhance mobility for urban commuters. Urban rail transportation is one of the 
priorities. It was claimed that the central government will build 3,000 kilometres of new 
urban rail lines during the 13th five-year (Xinhuanet, 2016). With no doubts, the private 
investment is strongly encouraged in the development of urban rail projects, which could 
be seen in several recent projects such as Beijing Metro Lines 14 and 16 (Si et al., 2016). 
However, unlike other public facilities such as toll roads or power plants, one of the 
major challenges of urban rail PPP projects is the huge investment, which makes it 
impossible for the private investors to obtain a reasonable rate of investment return from 
the expected revenues, thereby creating a financial gap. The financial gap needs to be 
closed with funds from the public sector. In this case, the public sector hence has to inject 
a large share of investment in an urban rail PPP project to attract private investors 
(Sharma et al., 2010). Although effective partnerships develop from shared interests, 
responsibilities and resources between the public and private sectors in a PPP project (Ke 
et al., 2010a, 2010b), there is potential for conflicts of interests. In order to better deliver 
urban rail PPP projects and protect public interests, this paper discusses the issue of 
private involvement with the aim of developing a procedural framework to determine the 
optimal private involvement in an urban rail PPP project in China. 
The term ‘private involvement’ in this paper has two-fold definitions. First, it refers 
to the share of investment (including both debt and equity) by the private sector, 
following Sharma et al. (2010). In China, subnational governments particularly value this 
meaning, especially the share of initial investment by the private sector; second, it also 
denotes a more comprehensive concept including responsibilities, obligations and risks 
undertaken, as well as resources and skills committed to a project by the private sector, 
following Jasiukevičius and Vasiliauskaitė (2012). 
The paper is structured as follows: an overview of the literature regarding PPPs in 
China and private involvement is presented, followed by a section describing the design 
methodology. The influencing factors are briefly introduced in the following section, 
based on which is a procedural framework to determine the optimal private involvement. 
The five-stage systematic framework is then further elaborated in detail. Concluding 
comments and limitations of the research together with opportunities for further research 
conclude the work. 
2 Literature review 
2.1 PPP practice and research in China 
The Shajiao B power plant project in Guangdong province was the first implementation 
of PPPs in China (Cheng et al., 2016). After 1996, the central government awarded 
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several state-approved pilot build-operate-transfer (BOT) projects to promote BOT on a 
larger scale. Thereafter, the involvement of private investors in infrastructure 
development grew rapidly, but fad out gradually at the end of the 1990s due to the 
Financial Crisis in Asia. Along with the continued rapid economic growth in China when 
stepping into the 21st century, the shortage of infrastructure imposed budgetary pressures 
on subnational governments and led to the second boom of private investment. Since late 
2013, the strong encouraging message from the central government has led to another 
boom of private investment in public projects after 2014 (Cheng et al., 2016). 
Along with the implementations of PPPs in China, there is increasing attention in the 
topic of PPPs in China, not only in international journals but also in domestic Chinese 
journals (Ke et al., 2009; Zhang et al., 2016). According to a statistical analysis of PPP 
publications by Ke et al. (2009), PPP papers published around 2000 can be categorised 
into three groups namely ‘risk’, ‘procurement’ and ‘financial’. New ideas and topics had 
been introduced in the publications after 2000, including: 
a investment environment 
b procurement 
c economics viability 
d financial package 
e risk allocation and management 
f governance issue 
g other integration research (Ke et al., 2009). 
In recent publications, the research topics have been switched from a pure construction 
perspective to a combination of topics on finance, law, public administration, 
construction and management. Current research topics published in the academic journals 
include: 
a selection of financing models 
b optimisation of financial structure 
c risk allocation and management 
d regulatory and institutional frameworks 
e behaviours of both sectors 
f determination of concession period 
g contract structure and key clauses 
h evaluation of private partners 
i performance indicators 
j price mechanism (Zhang et al., 2016). 
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2.2 PPP research in urban rail transportation in China 
Publications on the topic of urban rail transportation published by international scholars 
in international journals have been frequently seen, such as Hayashi (1989), Simpson 
(1990) and Wilmoth (1990). However, it is rare to read academic articles in international 
journals on the topic of PPP in urban rail transportation in China, especially published by 
researchers from Mainland China. To the best of authors’ knowledge, Yuan et al. (2010) 
identified 15 driving factors associated with PPP projects in metropolitan transportation 
systems from the perspective of Chinese public sector; de Jong et al. (2010) studies seven 
urban rail PPP projects in five large metropolitan areas in China; Roumboutsos et al. 
(2013) evaluated the experience of PPPs in China’s urban rail development with the 
focus on critical factors impacting on the project viability based on the case study of 
Beijing Metro Line 4; Chang (2013) also studied the Beijing Metro Line 4 to illustrate 
benefits, costs, opportunities and risks in PPPs in China, and he later studied the Beijing 
metro financing sustainability to demonstrate how subnational governments finance the 
investment in metro systems (Chang, 2014). 
2.3 Private involvement in PPPs 
The huge investment in an urban rail PPP project cannot rely on the private sector alone, 
which then requires public fiscal exposure. It is hence a critical question how to 
determine the private involvement. Unfortunately, there are not many research efforts to 
handle this issue. Sharma et al. (2010) presented a structured approach to determine the 
debt-equity investment between public and private sectors in PPP projects, which took 
into account financial factors alone. Jasiukevičius and Vasiliauskaitė (2012) formed a 
procedural model to evaluate the requirements for private sector’s involvement in the 
delivery of public services, which is rather practical and focuses more on ‘how’ than 
‘why’. Albalate et al. (2013) found that risk associated with cost recovery and relative 
cost of labour are key factors explaining the extent of private involvement. 
Publications that consider the targets or rules limiting fiscal exposure could provide a 
valuable reference to the research question in this paper to some extent. For instances, 
Irwin (2007) described an approach for governments to control spending commitments in 
PPPs; Peru’s Legislative Decree No. 1012 (which approves the framework law for PPP 
and its regulations) also states that the present value of total fiscal commitments to PPPs 
shall not exceed 7% of GDP (Peru, 2008); Liu and Pradelli (2012) provided another 
alternative that is to incorporate limits on PPP commitments within other fiscal targets 
like public debt. However, the above publications or government documents discussing 
the limits for fiscal exposure are mainly suitable in the situation where the private sector 
can undertake the PPP project financially, while the public sector is looking for some 
extent of involvement in order to achieve the best project performance. 
3 Research methodology 
As part of a comprehensive research into PPP implementation in urban rail PPP projects 
in China, multiple research methods, including content analysis, case study and focus 
group discussion were adopted to identify seven types of factors influencing the private 
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involvement, including project financial model, government fiscal commitment, risk 
allocation, public accountability, efficiency considerations, policy and regulations, and 
organisational marketing strategies. This paper will briefly introduce these influencing 
factors in the following section and mainly present a procedural framework based on 
these influencing factors to determine the optimal private involvement. 
The development of a procedural framework is based on the explanatory paradigm, 
i.e., this research aims at describing, explaining and predicting in order to understand the 
formation problem of optimal private involvement. However, understanding alone is not 
enough. The ultimate mission is to develop design knowledge, i.e., knowledge that can be 
used in designing solutions to problems in the field in question (Aken, 2004). The 
development of a procedural framework in this paper is considered as a process-design, 
i.e., the authors’ own subjective plan for the problem-solving cycle. According to Aken 
(2004), this type of process-design is of a heuristic nature, which can rather be described 
as ‘if you want to achieve Y in situation Z, then something like action X will help’. 
‘Something like action X’ is a general prescription which has to be translated to the 
specific problem at hand; in solving that problem, one has to design a specific variant of 
action X. But the indeterminate and heuristic nature makes it impossible to provide proof. 
To use the procedural framework for an application or for further research, readers need 
evidence to forecast the effectiveness of the framework and for translation into the new 
context. This is hence considered as one of the limitations of this paper. 
4 Influencing factors 
The influence of project financial model is straightforward and has been well reported in 
the literature, such as Sharma et al. (2010). In the sector of urban rail, there is generally a 
minimum investment by the public sector, i.e., a maximum investment by the private 
sector so as to achieve a reasonable rate of investment return. In the case of Beijing 
Metro Line 4, the private sector is responsible for the financing of part B (30% of total 
initial investment). Once the financial model is established and the private investor’s 
expected rate of investment return is assumed, the share of private investment could be 
calculated. 
Government fiscal commitment, including initial investment, ongoing payment and 
overall fiscal budget and balance, is significant to determine the private involvement 
(Roumboutsos et al., 2013). Among them, initial investment and ongoing payment by the 
public sector are actually included in the project financial model. Overall fiscal budget 
and balance is the fundamental factor that determines the government capability for 
initial investment and ongoing payment, thereby influencing the share of private 
investment. 
The arrangement to share or undertake risks by the private sector is included in the 
definition of private involvement. Risk allocation has been commonly seen in recent 
publications, such as Ke et al. (2010b, 2013). A general principle is that each risk should 
be allocated to the party best able to manage it at the least cost (Cooper et al., 2005). 
Such ability to manage risks may include whether the party is able to foresee the risk, 
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whether the party is able to control the risk chance of occurring, whether the party is able 
to manage the risk in case of occurring, and whether the party is able to sustain the 
consequences if the risk occurs (Lam et al., 2007). 
PPPs change the dynamics of public accountability by involving private partners in 
government decision making and program delivery (Forrer et al., 2010). The terms and 
conditions of private involvement deserve careful scrutiny and understanding by public 
officials, as private partners enter into a PPP project for different reasons than 
governments such as pursuing profits (Chan et al., 2009). In the sector of urban rail 
projects, accountability requirements are complicated, because government 
responsibilities are shared with the private partners and this horizontal relationship 
between the public and private sectors may cause many contemporary challenges. 
The concept of adopting PPPs to improve the efficiency in delivering public services 
is in fact not fresh in many countries such as Australia (Infrastructure Australia, 2008), 
but not given sufficient attention in China yet (Cheng et al., 2016). Under the severe 
fiscal pressure, the major driving force for most subnational governments to choose PPPs 
over traditional procurement is still economy-related (Chan et al., 2009). Nevertheless, as 
a straightforward principle, tasks in that the private sector has a more efficient capability 
should be allocated to the private. 
In China, there is no formal process for deciding the type and extent of government 
support for PPPs, nor the private involvement. However, there are some particular 
regulations that may influence the private involvement to some extent. Taking Beijing for 
instance, Beijing Municipal Commission of Development and Reform (2013) prescribes 
a concession period of 30 years and an expected return on investment of 8% for private 
investors. A reasonable share of private investment could be calculated using these 
prescribed economic conditions. 
For private investors, it is important to maintain a good relationship with the 
subnational governments and a good track record of past performance in order to grasp a 
share of the PPP market. Ke et al. (2015) proved that organisational marketing strategies 
towards relational contracting have a positive impact on the project outcomes, especially 
client satisfaction and relationship quality among contracting parties. In other words, 
different organisational marketing strategies could lead to different decisions on the 
private involvement in a PPP project. 
5 Five-stage systematic framework 
The formation of the private involvement in an urban rail PPP project is important to 
project success, as it may arise possible problems related with the role of each party and 
apportionment of risks, liabilities and rewards between partners (Jasiukevičius and 
Vasiliauskaitė, 2012). However, very few information was disclosed in the PPP literature 
yet. In light of the above-mentioned influencing factors, this paper will present a  
five-stage systematic framework in Figure 1 by systemising various literature by 
Jasiukevičius and Vasiliauskaitė (2012), Ke et al. (2010b), Sharma et al. (2010), Zhang 
(2005), Zhang and Chen (2013). 
 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   274 Y. Ke    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
Figure 1 Five-stage framework for formation of optimal private involvement in urban rail PPP 
projects 
Assessment of public 
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The process of optimal private involvement formation firstly starts from the assessment 
whether to deliver the urban rail project via PPP. In the second and third stages, the 
public and private sectors determine the risk allocation and calculate the amount and plan 
of private investment under the conditions of organisational marketing strategies and 
policy and regulations. In these two stages, project financial model, government fiscal 
commitment, risk allocation, policy and regulations, and organisational marketing 
strategies are considered. The output of the second and third stages is the preliminary 
design of concession contract defining the share of investment, responsibilities, 
obligations, risks undertaken, resources and skills committed to the project. In stages four 
and five, the requirements for public accountability and efficiency consideration are 
validated to ensure that private involvement in an urban rail project would not become a 
detrimental action to the public interests. 
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5.1 Assessment of PPP feasibility 
It has been practiced in many mature PPP markets such as the UK and Australia, when 
choosing a delivery method, the government needs to compare the chosen PPP model 
with a public sector comparator to demonstrate value for money (VFM) and enhance the 
partnership evaluation (Zhang and Chen, 2013). However, this quantitative assessment 
was recently reinforced in the Guide on Operation of PPP Projects (interim) issued by the 
MOF in November 2014, which also requires a quantitative assessment of public 
liabilities of subnational governments over the project life cycle. The MOF issued a 
Guide on Evaluation of VFM in PPP projects (interim) in December 2015, which was 
updated in October 2016. 




Packaging of services 
Project risks 
Expected revenue 
Nature of project business 
Innovation requirements 
Performance requirements 
Life cycle of project assets 
Technology requirements 
Complexity 













Selection of delivery  
model 





Partly shared by private sector 
PPP 










   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   276 Y. Ke    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
Before the issuance of MOF’s guide, there were no mechanisms for VFM assessments or 
other decision-making frameworks to ensure that PPP is the most appropriate option. 
Because of the immense budgetary pressure on the governments to provide infrastructure, 
the concerns regarding efficiency in project procurement and delivery as well as specific 
conditions of the target project are often ignored (Cheng et al., 2016). The certain extent 
of blindness in selecting PPP projects was regarded as one of the reasons why many PPP 
projects have failed (Wang, 2014). 
After the issuance of MOF’s guide, due to the shortage of data and skills to enable 
such quantitative assessment, there is still some way to go until a coherent regulatory 
environment is realised and can be enforced (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2015). A 
strong evidence is the spectacular number of PPP projects, 10,471 projects as of 
September 2016, in the project database of the MOF, only 946 of which have entered the 
implementation stages (China Public-Private Partnerships Center, 2016). Identifying 
VFM and bringing it to life remain challenging even in countries with long experience 
with PPPs such as the UK (IISD, 2015). Therefore, in the recommended framework for 
assessing PPP feasibility as shown in Figure 2, a quantitative VFM assessment is not the 
core requirement. Instead, a comparative analysis of different delivery models and a 
qualitative analysis taking into account the project characteristics and market 
competitiveness are highlighted. 
In addition, the government in China is usually bound to invest in an urban rail PPP 
project in order to improve the financial attractiveness. There is hence a need for a formal 
process for deciding the type and extent of government support for PPPs, which 
unfortunately was missing before the MOF’s guide. The government officials made a 
decision based on their own judgments or preferences while the general public and even 
the professionals and academics have little or no influence on the decision making (Sachs 
et al., 2007). A decision node is hence proposed at the end of the assessment of PPP 
feasibility with the purpose of determining the necessity of public investment in the PPP 
project. Two of the above-mentioned influencing factors, i.e., project financial model and 
government fiscal commitment, will be taken into account at this decision node, so as to 
evaluate the public fiscal liability and project commercial capacity, thereby determining 
whether an initial investment from the government is required. 
5.2 Risk allocation 
Given the comprehensive concept of private involvement including responsibilities, 
obligations and risks undertaken, as well as resources and skills committed to a project by 
the private sector, it is straightforward that risk allocation should be one of the necessary 
procedures to determine the private involvement. Being one of the major drivers for 
VFM, risk allocation in a PPP project aims to distribute risks to the party who is best able 
to manage at the least cost (Ke et al., 2010b). An equitable risk allocation scheme hence 
denotes a clear division of roles and responsibilities among contracting parties. In 
addition, risk allocation is commonly defined through the contractual documents, which 
can thus be considered as a trade-off between the private sectors’ price for undertaking 
the work and their willingness to accept the risk allocation scheme (Lam et al., 2007). In 
the context of urban rail PPP projects, the trade-off can mainly be interpreted by the 
design of price and adjustment mechanisms. In summary, a framework to allocate risks is 
demonstrated in Figure 3. The proposed risk allocation framework has two stages, i.e., to 
revise the preferred risk allocation and to design the price and adjustment mechanisms. 
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Because there is currently no formal risk allocation scheme example from the 
government, the first stage starts with a preferred risk allocation scheme from findings on 
the topic of risk allocation in China’s PPP projects, such as Ke et al. (2010b, 2011, 2013). 
The preferred risk allocation scheme is adopted as the basis to determine the revised 
allocation based on the specific project characteristics as per the following steps: 
a To examine whether the public and private sectors have a significant difference in 
risk management ability. If there is a significant difference, it is then recommended 
to allocate the risk to the party that is better able to manage and enter the second 
stage. 
b Else, to examine whether both parties have a significant difference in negotiation 
power. If there is a significant difference, it is then recommended to allocate the risk 
to the party that has a weaker negotiation power in order to foster the procurement 
process and enter the second stage. 
c Else, to examine whether the government is willing to the undertake the risk. If the 
government decides to offer the incentive, it is then recommended to allocate the risk 
to the government and enter the second stage. 
The output of the first stage is a set of revised risk allocation. It is certain that risks are 
allocated to the party better able to manage, if there is a significant difference in risk 
management ability. 
Roles and responsibilities are then divided based on the revised risk allocation and 
preferred risk allocation contract terms. The purpose of the second stage is to investigate 
the fundamental factors for the design of price and adjustment mechanisms as per the 
following steps: 
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a To examine whether the risk taker is the risk causer. It is recommended that risk 
taker if being the risk causer could not request for a risk premium of that risk. 
b To investigate the risk premium concentrated on the measurement of risks 
undertaken by non-risk causer. 
c To examine whether the government is willing to offer an incentive in terms of 
pricing. 
The output of the second stage is the considerations of fundamental factors for the design 
of price and adjustment mechanisms. 
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5.3 Calculation of private investment 
After the identification, evaluation and allocation of risks, it is then possible to calculate 
the optimal proportion of private investment. This calculation is important to urban rail 
PPP projects, which generally do not have sufficient profitability for private sectors to 
invest alone. When assessing the feasibility of PPP in a project, VFM calculation is 
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required by the MOF’s guide. The financial model 1 shown in Figure 4 using traditional 
contracting and taking into account risk probability and impact is hence available when 
calculating the optimal proportion of private investment. The adoption of PPP model 
would import some changes to the financial model 1 in terms of changes in variables and 
their risks, in light of which a new financial model 2 can be then obtained. These changes 
include: 
a the property owner changes of several financial variables (e.g., the operation revenue 
will be taken by the private investors instead of the government) 
b the value changes of several financial variables (e.g., the reduced costs of operation 
and maintenance) 
c new financial variables (e.g., the proportion of private investment) 
d changes in risk probability and impact associated with financial variables. 
Goal programming is recommended to calculate the optimal proportion of private 
investment in this framework. The goal is set as to obtain the maximum difference in net 
present value (NPV) of project between traditional contracting and PPP, described as 
2 1Z NPV NPV  
where NPV1 denotes the net present value under traditional contracting, while NPV2 
denotes that under PPP. The values of NPV can be calculated by the abovementioned 
financial models, and approximately described as 
( , , , , , , )c f mNPV f volume price cost cost cost sub  
where 
volume traffic flow volume 
price ticket fare 
costc construction cost 
costf financial cost 
costm operation and maintenance cost 
sub public fiscal subsidy 
 proportion of private investment. 
In recognition of the success of Beijing Subway Line 4 project (Chang, 2013, 2014), it 
could be used as a benchmarking case to calculate the target value of the goal 
programming. Possible values can then be derived based on different assumptions of 
private involvement, which lead to two types of deviations including: under-achievement 
of the goal as represented by negative deviation (d–) and over-achievement of the goal as 
represented by positive deviation (d+). To achieve the above-mentioned goal, the 
achievement function is set as 
min z f d  
subject to: 
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 D – DS + E1 – P1 > γE2 (considering public interests), in which: 
D debt 
DS debt service 
E1 private equity 
E2 public equity 
P1 profit sharing for private investors 
γ public opportunity-loss coefficient. 
 D × DSCR ≤ R (considering debt capacity constraint), in which: 
DSCR debt service coverage ratio 
R present value of cash flows. 
 DSt ≤ (Rt – costm(t)) (considering debt service constraint), in which: 
costm(t) operation and maintenance cost at time t. 
 D + E1 + E2 ≥ costc (considering initial project investment). 








 (considering project attractiveness), in which: 
T concession length 
ip(min) minimum required rate of return for private investor 
P1(t) profit sharing for private investors at time t. 







 (considering capping private return), in which: 
ip(max) maximum required rate of return for private investor. 
 pricemin ≤ price ≤ pricemax (considering price acceptance), in which: 
pricemin minimum required ticket fare to maintain project attractiveness 
pricemax maximum ticket fare accepted by the public. 
 submin ≤ sub ≤ submax (considering public fiscal capacity), in which: 
submin minimum required public subsidy to maintain project attractiveness 
submax maximum public subsidy capacity. 
5.4 Public accountability 
The previous two stages of risk allocation and calculation of private investment can 
determine the private involvement taking into account its twofold definitions considered 
in this paper, thereby obtaining preliminary contract design. However, because of the 
nature of PPP projects, it is necessary to conduct a review to guarantee the achievement 
of public accountability and efficiency improvement. Figure 5 presents a framework for 
validation of public accountability with the purpose of meeting the requirements of public 
accountability during the project. Because of the lack of robust project audit mechanisms 
for PPP projects in China (Cheng et al., 2016), it is hence important to provide relevant 
indicators and procedures for public accountability in individual PPP contracts. 
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Figure 5 Validation of public accountability 
Preliminary contract design
























Final contract design 
 
In term of indicators for the private investors, output specifications and contract 
obligations are highlighted in the framework. In the context of urban rail PPP projects, 
the output specifications include facilities and assets specifications (e.g., design, 
construction, operation, and maintenance) and urban rail operation specifications (e.g., 
ticket fare, traffic flow, train frequency, and safety), while contract obligations designate 
private investors’ roles and responsibilities such as communication management, change 
management, risk management and relevant operation management to ensure the project 
success. The framework shown in Figure 5 is then to review and validate whether the 
above indicators are available with clear and dynamic descriptions. 
In term of indicators for the public sector, risk and emergency management is the 
most important in the context of urban rail PPP projects. This is consistent with the notice 
from the State Council on the Emergency Response Plan for National Urban Rail 
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Transport Operation issued in May 2015. The purpose of public sector indicator design is 
to meet the management requirements for the government in running an urban rail PPP 
project, in which emergency management responsibilities are not recommended to be 
allocated to the private. The first task is to check the availability of risk warning 
indicators, which are necessary to daily operational monitoring, risk analysis and 
information reporting. The second task is to validate the availability of risk management 
plan in order to ensure risks are allocated to the party best able to manage and a long time 
risk management plan is in place. The third task is to validate the availability of 
emergency plan so that a management plan is in place to respond to the occurrence of risk 
events. 
In addition, it is imperative to investigate the design of procedures for public 
accountability in the individual PPP contract with the purpose of meeting public audit 
requirements. Two key procedures are the reporting mechanism and contract 
renegotiation mechanism. The purpose of reporting mechanism is to meet the information 
disclosure requirements for the general public as well as the performance review 
requirements during and after the concession period (Michalski-Karl et al., 2009). 
Contract renegotiation may be necessary to improve the performance of the partnership 
due to the inevitable incompleteness of concession contracts for a long-term PPP project 
(Cruz et al., 2015). Therefore, the second key procedure recommended is the contract 
renegotiation mechanism, which aims to offer flexibility for the public and private sectors 
to make necessary adjustments as per the outcome of public accountability. 
5.5 Efficiency consideration 
A study conducted by Chan et al. (2009) on drivers of adopting PPPs found that 
respondents from China rated economy-related drivers higher, indicating that government 
agencies may neglect the significance of efficiency improvement in structuring PPP 
agreement. Therefore, a framework for validation of efficiency consideration with the 
purpose of meeting the requirements of efficiency improvement during the project is 
proposed as shown in Figure 6. The improvement of efficiency resulted from the 
participation of private sectors in an urban rail PPP project could contribute to the goal of 
reducing life-cycle costs. 
The validation framework for efficiency improvement includes two parts, i.e., 
qualitative and quantitative efficiency check. 
The quantitative efficiency check aims to ensure that the involvement of private 
sectors in an urban rail PPP project will lead to an improved value for money. Compared 
to the traditional procurement method, the involvement of private sector in a PPP project 
brings in many changes to the financial model, such as an increase of 
participation/procurement cost and a reduction of total project cost including financial 
service cost, operational cost, labour cost due to less employment positions, etc. (Chan  
et al., 2009; Chan et al., 2010). The important step in the quantitative efficiency check is 
hence to ensure the design of preliminary contract reflects the changes of financial 
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Figure 6 Validation of efficiency improvement 
























Final contract design 
 
The purpose of qualitative efficiency check is to guarantee the delivery of each major 
task is more innovative than the traditional delivery mode. In urban rail projects, the tasks 
of design, finance, construction, operation, business and comprehensive management are 
particularly important. It is therefore imperative to check whether innovation designs are 
in place for these tasks. 
6 Conclusions 
This paper has looked at the procedural framework to determine the private involvement 
in urban rail PPP projects in China. The term of private involvement does not only refer 
to the share of investment by the private sector, but also denote a more comprehensive 
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concept including responsibilities, obligations and risks undertaken, as well as resources 
and skills committed to a project by the private sector. 
The proposed five-stage systematic framework firstly starts from the assessment 
whether to deliver the urban rail project via PPP. In the second and third stages, the 
public and private sectors determine the risk allocation and calculate the amount and plan 
of private investment under the conditions of organisational marketing strategies and 
policy and regulations. The output of the second and third stages is the preliminary 
design of concession contract defining the share of investment, responsibilities, 
obligations, risks undertaken, resources and skills committed to the project. In stages four 
and five, the requirements for public accountability and efficiency consideration are 
validated to ensure that private involvement in an urban rail project would not become a 
detrimental action to the public interests. 
The findings add to the current knowledge base by summarising an appropriate and 
systematic procedural framework for the allocation of involvement in an urban rail PPP 
project. They are also beneficial for the industry practitioners as a management 
framework to determine the appropriateness of private involvement. The management 
implication is that designing a deal structure in a PPP project should consider all the 
procedures included in the framework. 
Although the study scope is limited to urban rail projects in this paper, the findings 
can be generally applicable to other infrastructure sectors, especially for PPP projects 
where it is difficult for private investors to obtain a reasonable rate of investment return 
from the expected revenues. The procedural framework can also be generalised for 
countries where governments are legally allowed to develop government-pays PPPs. 
However, countries vary widely in how they document and give force to PPP 
frameworks. Readers need to be careful when using the proposed procedural framework 
to a different country. 
Because of the indeterminate and heuristic nature in the research methodology, it is 
difficult to provide proof at this stage. To use the procedural framework for an 
application or for further research, readers need evidence to forecast the effectiveness of 
the framework and for translation into the new context. This is hence considered as one 
of the limitations of this paper. However, through multiple case-studies, one can 
accumulate supporting evidence, which can be a direction of future research. 
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